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Summary  
The corporate governance practices of EU bank group were based on the principle 
of self-regulation. The negative effects of adoptation of the principle were on stakeholders 
account – deposit insurance funds, government loans, depositors, and taxpayers.  
The international financial crisis gives reasons for new institutional framework. The 
taken measures on pan-European level defined new role for traditional actors in which key 
actors are shareholders and regulators. The new instruments in modern corporate 
governance are decrease of corporate structure complexity and isolation of different services 
in separate entities.  
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Policies for free movement of capital and competitiveness determine the profile of 
the EU banking system at the beginning of the XXI century. They are used in national 
programs for economic growth through active participation of banks. The supervisory 
authorities allows restructuring of banking groups, incl. removal of risk activities in the new 
member states from Eastern Europe, creating a complex organizational structures and 
offering new financial services.  
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 The liberalization of financial markets creates complex and interdependent 
financial system1. Individual national economies have become dependent on other countries 
and create an environment in which financial difficulties can be easily transferred and 
threaten the entire financial system.  
Transnational banking groups have built complex organizational structures outside 
national borders, but the management and control stayed at home state. The pluralistic 
structure of the EU banking system, the diverse nature of the commitments on corporate 
governance and the different business models represented strength of the banking sector in 
the EU, but also a factor that hinders future integration and the emergence of a single pan-
European banking model2. 
 
The new reality considers corporate governance to a qualitatively new level. The 
report „de Larosière“ (2009) to the European Commission describes corporate governance 
practices as „one of the most important shortcomings of the current crisis“3. 
The position represented by the Steering Group of the OECD (2009) identified four 
weaknesses in corporate governance contributed to the financial crisis: remuneration of 
executive directors, risk management, practices of the board of directors/management board 
and implementation of shareholder rights4. Admitted shortcomings are the actions of 
politicians and companies in the implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. 
As a result of the economic crisis is formed opinion about greater use of regulation 
instead of regulatory „codes and standards“5. The crisis has opened an old debate about the 
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costs and benefits of regulation as an opponent of market mechanisms. In some cases, 
supervisors have been subject to potentially, contradictory aims and interests, such as 
protecting investors and maintaining the security of banking institutions. 
 
Measures to coordinate the supervision of credit institutions should be applied to all 
credit institutions in order to protect savings and to create equal conditions of competition 
between them6. New supervisory policies are geared to advantage of the public interest 
before the bank interests7. National reforms on corporate governance are aimed at 
transforming from „stability“ to „stakeholders“8. 
 
Modern corporate governance policies cover its actors and instruments:  
- Shareholders (rights and responsibilities); 
- Management boards (remuneration of managers); 
- Auditors (exchange of information with the supervisory authorities); 
- Regulators (regulation rather than regulatory "codes and standards" and 
convergence of supervisory practices); 
- Tools (reducing the complexity of organizational structures and the 
possibility of transmission of financial crises). 
Dynamics of EU policies to improve practices in corporate governance for the 
period 2006-2013 includes: shareholders (active exercise of rights and responsibilities), 
managers (reducing „risk appetite“ through policies on the remuneration), regulators 
(convergence of practices, including external auditors and new tools). 
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Tool 1: Reducing the complexity and interconnectedness of group structures  
The motives for the efficient use of capital and liquidity, tax benefits, supervisory 
requirements, legal requirements of previous corporate structure of a merger, led to complex 
corporate ownership structures in banking groups. Group structures and intra-group relations 
are generated from interest on servicing corporate objectives: getting high ratings and meet 
the requirements of the supervisory authority.  
According to the Basel Committee reduction of the complexity and 
interconnectedness of group structures and activities is a major tool for improving practices 
in corporate governance9. Solutions to overcome the crisis are further hampered and 
expensive by the presence of large international groups with corporate structures operating 
in several jurisdictions and their internal and external exposure and relationships. Measures 
on simplification of group structures will contribute to an acceptable solution in the event of 
bankruptcy regardless of the financial sector and the state of business. Last but not least, the 
effective reduction of the complexity of group structures will contribute to more rapid 
recovery of banks and lending to the real economy, which are vital for economic growth10. 
 
Regardless of the achieved economic integration, the opportunities for intervention 
by supervisors remained within national boundaries. The series of remedial measures at 
national level and a wave of uncoordinated bankruptcies put on the agenda further 
challenges to EU. 
In modern conditions the competent authorities received additional powers that 
allow them to require changes to business structures of banking groups and restrict banking 
activities. An additional tool is early intervention by supervisors, including the requirement 
for the transfer of some activities, the appointment of an emergency manager and stop the 
payment of dividends. 
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Tool 2: Reduce the likelihood of transmission of crisis  
Another tool in corporate governance is to reduce the likelihood of contagion 
between activities performed by banks. In actions in the EU Structural reforms prevail over 
nonstructural11.  
One reform in the EU provides commercial banks to separate the trade with their 
own funds in self-financed units. The recommendations of the expert group of Erkki 
Liikanen to the European Commission provide „fencing“ (ring-fencing) of the operations of 
banks, including deposits from depositors and lending to small businesses from the other 
activities of banks. The „ring-fenced“ legal person of the bank must have its own policy on 
corporate governance. The aim is to increase the security of banks by separating high-risk 
banking activities of daily banking and to prevent the transmission of „financial contagion“ 
and protect creditors and depositors. For cross-border banks imposed restrictions on intra-
group transactions aimed at protecting the „financial contagion“ from the parent bank and 
withdrawal of capital12. 
 
The separation of activities as a tool to reduce the risks apply in the EU according 
to the recommendations of the report of the Liikanen (2011), in the UK - the Commission of 
Vickers (2011) and in the US – Volker’s rule (2012). General between recommendations is 
the mandatory nature of the separation of commercial banking from investment banking13. 
Using this tool will help to strengthen the banking groups in several ways. First, it 
will encapsulate the banks to protect themselves from losses. Secondly, will allow banks 
subsidiaries to obtain local facilities for loans from the central bank and deposit insurance 
schemes. Third, reduced complexity and size of banking groups to make them more 
transparent to external stakeholders and easier decision-making, which in turn will improve 
risk management and market discipline. All these benefactors will reduce the exposure to 
taxpayers losses from the banking sector. 
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Conclusion 
European policies for the reform of corporate governance are transformed by 
„competitiveness“ through „resistance“ to „stakeholders“. New tools in corporate 
governance led to desubsidiarization of banking groups in sectoral and territorial principle. 
The objectives of the new instruments in the corporate governance of banking 
groups can be summarized as: 
- maintain financial stability and confidence in banks, while avoiding the effect of 
contagion; 
- reduce exposure to taxpayers losses from the banking sector and reduce moral 
hazard; 
- reduce the costs of the national network security; 
- facilitate the process of decision-making in future crisis; 
- incentive for banks to participate in economic growth; 
- coordination and overlapping of the objectives pursued by the various national 
authorities in situations of bankruptcy; 
- elimination of the need for action at EU level for selecting the resolution 
authorities and procedures for bank stabilization.  
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